
The “new antisemitism” in Europe: reflections from a UK perspective

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The day on which I spoke in Berne, presenting the paper on which this article is based, was the 80th anniversary of Kristallnacht. The Nazi-spawned attacks in Germany and Austria which took place on 9 November 1938 with the express encouragement of the state, saw Jewish places of worship, Jewish businesses and Jewish homes ransacked and destroyed on a massive scale. This event has ever since been recognised as marking the beginning of the ultimate stage of the persecution of Jewish communities in those countries over the next six and a half years. I suppose that one could at least say that it is one extreme example of “Religion-State relations in historical and contemporary perspectives”, which was the overarching theme of the conference at which my presentation was made. It is interesting that Kristallnacht itself happened exactly 15 years after the so-called Beer Hall Putsch of 9 November 1923 – the failed attempt by Hitler and the early Nazis to overthrow the Weimar Republic. It would be fascinating to discover if there was a deliberate connection between these dates.

When I was invited to contribute a paper to the conference on religion-state relationships, particularly bearing in mind contemporary and changing realities in the continent of Europe, my initial thought was that some reflection on the topic of antisemitism¹ could be useful. Certainly, the issue of antisemitism has been a “live” concern in the political scene of my own country – the United Kingdom. I did not want to provide an abstract at a too early stage, because I wanted my paper to be responsive to the events and discussions which I suspected were going to unfold over the months leading up to the conference. I was clearly prescient, but I have to acknowledge that even I really was not expecting an event such as the horrific massacre that took place at the synagogue in Pittsburgh less than

¹ Note: the term “antisemitism” is preferred to “anti-Semitism” on the grounds that the former is clearly referring to a very specific negative prejudice, namely hatred of Jews and Judaism. The latter expression, linguistically speaking could refer to antipathy to “Semites” as a category, and this can, misleadingly, include the Arab-speaking (Semitic language) world [ed.].

two weeks before the conference. Apart from anything else, it was the fact that it took place in the United States, where the Jewish community has on the whole felt comparatively secure for decades, that was so startling, as indeed was the apparent right-wing white nationalist motivation of the assailant. It may be illogical on my part, but I heaved a sigh of relief as soon as I realised that the perpetrator of this atrocity was not a Muslim and not an immigrant to the United States.

What do I mean by my phrase, “new antisemitism”? I am primarily referring to hostile attitudes to Jews and Judaism linked to antagonism towards Israel and specifically towards Zionism. I do not believe that anti-Zionism is necessarily a manifestation of antisemitism, but I am very conscious that it is all too easy for the former to shade into the latter. I also want to say that there is a qualitative difference between criticism of the policies of Israel as a nation, which I think is quite legitimate and I myself have engaged in publicly and explicitly from time to time, and criticism of diaspora Jews explicitly on the grounds of their own pro-Zionism or sympathies for Israel. Even if such sympathies are wrong, and I am not sure that they are, they are certainly understandable given the realities of Jewish history. To make blanket criticism of Jews or Jewish communities for holding pro-Zionist views can legitimately be described as a form of antisemitism. In this respect, the abusive term “Zio” which seems to have come into more frequent use in recent years to describe diaspora Jews is telling. Intriguingly, it is a term that seems to have originated in right-wing American antisemitism, but these days it is more commonly used in left-wing circles.² Baroness Shami Chakrabarti, who was responsible for the internal report produced by the UK Labour Party to discuss antisemitism in its ranks, says that “Zio” is a “modern-day racist epithet” and “a term of abuse, pure and simple”.³

A thoughtful recent report that comes out the Swedish context makes a clear distinction between criticism of Israel and Israeli policies, and criticism of diaspora Jewish communities.⁴ The report refers to what it calls “Israel-derived antisemitism” to describe the latter. Unlike “tradi-

² See for example <https://mosaicmagazine.com/observation/israel-zionism/2016/03/whore-you-calling-a-zio/?print> (accessed 8.10.2019).

³ <https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Chakrabarti-Inquiry-Report-30June16.pdf>, p. 9 (accessed 8.10.2019).

⁴ <http://www.kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/PP%203%20Antisemitisms%20160608.pdf> (accessed 8.10.2019).

tional” antisemitism, the voices of the “new antisemitism” seem largely to be concentrated among more left-wing groups and politicians in European politics and society, and, it has been suggested, may also be present among migrant communities, especially those coming from a Muslim or a Middle Eastern background. Part of what I am seeking to do in this paper is try and tease out what relationship there may be between the “new” antisemitism and its more traditional relative. A very problematic remark on Twitter by the British peer Baroness Jenny Tonge in reaction to the Pittsburgh synagogue attack (27 October 2018) went as follows: “Absolutely appalling and a criminal act but does it ever occur to Bibi and the present Israeli government that it’s [sic] actions against Palestinians may be reigniting antisemitism?” Tonge later withdrew the comment, after justified criticism,⁵ but the question she probably unintentionally implied is at least interesting – what, if any, is the relationship between the extreme right-wing views of that particular assassin and hostility towards Israel and Israeli policies?

A few years ago, there had been an anti-Jewish atrocity in France, perpetrated by a Muslim or Muslims who were part of the North African immigrant community in the country. A right-wing traditionalist politician – who, I believe, self-identified as Roman Catholic – commented on the incident in the following terms: “The trouble with these Muslim immigrants is that they don’t understand traditional European values.” The speaker totally failed to realise the bitter irony that “traditional European values” have surely been responsible for antagonism to, discrimination against and blatant persecution of Jews on a continent-wide and at least millennium-long scale.

There is a number of pertinent recently produced surveys and reports on antisemitism, especially in Europe, that I read in preparing this paper.⁶ The fact that so many of them have been produced during recent years is, in itself, telling, as is their style and content. They are substantially composed of statistical surveys, illustrated extensively by graphs. The amount

⁵ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/british-lawmaker-synagogue-shooting-shows-israel-reignites-anti-semitism/> (accessed 8.10.2019).

⁶ <http://www.kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/PP%203%20Antisemitisms%20160608.pdf>; http://global100.adl.org/?_ga=2.62660206.331128524.1570454011-280893798.1549018410#map; https://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR.2017.Antisemitism_in_contemporary_Great_Britain.pdf; <http://www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk/assets/Uploads/FINAL-REVISED-ENGLISH-FINAL-REPORT-Nov-2018.pdf> (all accessed 8.10.2019).

of reflection offered in them is comparatively limited. Presumably, this is partly due to the underlying belief of the writers that statistics have an objectivity to them in a way that a scholar's own personal reflections might not. I have to say, though, that having boggled my eyes over so many graphs I did come to feel that statistics are perhaps not so objective after all, but are often presented and interpreted in a way that reinforces the researcher's underlying initial perceptions. Some of the reports are produced by organisations, such as the ADL (Anti-Defamation League) and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, that have a clear link to the Jewish community. Others came out of organisations which would claim academic independence such as the Germany-based Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and Future" working with *The Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism* that is linked to Birkbeck College of the University of London. A review of this latter work drew attention to the likely genesis of these reports: "There is substantial anecdotal evidence that many antisemitic incidents in recent years, including physical threats and violence, can be traced to certain sectors of the Muslim community, although until recently most governments have been reluctant to acknowledge this."⁷ The reports were, in effect, intended to check out this perception, although doing it as discretely as possible. That says something about the sensitivity of the issue. The reports between them covered the situation in a number of countries, namely the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Hungary and Sweden. I am largely going to concentrate on the situation in the United Kingdom, though drawing attention to other countries as a point of comparison. Currently, the relationship between antisemitism and the political sphere is in any case a particularly challenging topic in the United Kingdom.

Some of the reports took as their starting point the influx of refugees into Europe from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries. This has happened since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011. Given that many of these refugees come from countries that officially display an implacable hostility towards Israel, it is perhaps not surprising for governments and for the Jewish communities in the receiving European countries to be concerned of the possibility of importation of antisemitic views and, even more so, acts of violence against Jews. In fact,

⁷ <https://www.thejc.com/comment/comment/recent-study-into-rising-antisemitism-in-europe-ignores-the-role-of-muslim-migrants-andrew-baker-ajc-1.464720> (accessed 8.10.2019).

the key reports that explored this subject, published in 2018, suggest that antisemitism is not a significant response being expressed by many of the current crop of refugees from the MENA region.⁸ On the whole, their main focus is their personal struggle to find a home in the west, and the very fact that they have chosen to leave their native country as a refugee might suggest that they do not necessarily accept wholeheartedly the official line regarding Jews as expressed in the homelands from which they have come. However, the reports did note also that many MENA refugees were genuinely ignorant about Jews and Judaism and that as part of their adaptation to western society it was going to be important that they received accurate information about Judaism.

The reports also revealed something else. I turn in the first instance to the United Kingdom, which, compared with many other European nations, since 2011 has not received a substantial number of MENA refugees. None of the MENA countries is in the top 20 of the native lands of immigrants to the United Kingdom who have arrived in the last 10 years or so. There is, and has been, substantial immigration to the United Kingdom since 2001 but, as well as coming from other parts of Europe, it reflects the South Asian, African and Caribbean communities that were already present in the UK. It is interesting that out of a group of five countries surveyed in one report (UK, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands) the United Kingdom saw the largest increase in percentage terms of its migrant population between 2001 and 2017. What does seem to be the case, however, is that though there is no particular evidence of antisemitism among recent arrivals in the country, there is a raised level of both antisemitic and anti-Israel views among second generation migrants, particularly those adhering to the Muslim religion. The percentages are still quite small, but they are statistically noticeable. Among the Muslims surveyed, there is a distinct correlation between the form of Islam they practise and the views they hold. Non-practising Muslims did not show a statistically raised level in relation to the questions explored. In the case of conservative Muslims, it does not seem to have been the fervency of their practice that made a difference to their attitudes towards Judaism but whether or not they espoused a version of political Islam. Those that did so were considerably more likely to have some anti-Israel and antisemitic views than other Muslims, other migrants, and indeed the population as a whole.

⁸ The report produced by The Pears Institute, referenced above.

This significance of the role of the second generation of migrants in relation to such questions seems also to be echoed in France. It is migrants largely from former French colonies in North Africa who form the majority of France's Muslim population, many from families who have been settled in France for two or three generations. Although we are still talking about a minority of a minority, among such groups there does seem to be conclusive evidence of hostility to Jews, sometimes translating into physical attacks. Of course, such attacks on Jews are a sub-set of wider attacks on the French population, particularly on targets that can be seen as un-Islamic in some way. What is also true in both France and the United Kingdom is that those who perpetrate such acts, whether on specifically Jewish targets or more widely, seem on the whole to come from communities where, in this second generation, there is a powerful sense of alienation from the host culture. This alienation has grown rather than diminished over the decades since their parents or grandparents arrived. There is clearly work to be done in relation to continuing integration, which has to include both economic and social elements, to help create a society that is diverse and healthy. It is, I think, a signal that proactive work is vital to help the current generation of refugees and migrants in Europe find a real sense of belonging in European societies.

There is a vivid case study of this offered in France by the comedian Dieudonne. Born of a Cameroonian father and a Breton French mother, he can be considered in some ways an exemplar of a disaffected second generation, even though he himself was brought up as a Roman Catholic. Certainly, it is this sense of alienation that he has sought to convey in his public performances and persona. He is clearly out to shock. However, beginning about 2002, Jews and Israel seem rather often to have been a target of his crude humour. Over the years his style of humour has got more and more outrageous, leading to numerous prosecutions or attempted prosecutions by the French state against Dieudonne under France's hate speech legislation. Particularly well-known is Dieudonne's encouragement of his supporters to use what is called the "quenelle" gesture, which seems to be intended as a deliberate "echo" of the Nazi salute.⁹ In more

⁹ A "quenelle" is initially an object that appears in French cooking, especially in the region of Lyon. It is a sausage-shaped object made of flour bound together with egg. Its particular shape means that it is also widely used as a slang term for the male genital organ. Dieudonne and his supporters however, in linking the "quenelle" also to the Nazi salute take the crudity of its use considerably further.

recent years the “pineapple” has also become a symbol associated with Dieudonne’s followers – due to his linking of the Hebrew word “Shoah” (Holocaust) with the French word “ananas” as “Shoananas” in a satirical song. What is particularly fascinating though is the way that Dieudonne seems to provide a bridge in France between the disaffected left and the disaffected right, particularly in his antisemitic views – and I think that genuinely one can only use the word “antisemitic” to describe these public attitudes. He is notorious for having courted Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former President of Iran. He stood in the European Parliament elections in 2004 for an extreme left-wing party called Euro-Palestine. He is recorded as suggesting in a public interview that Christians should “join” Islam. At the same time, he is personally friendly with Jean Marie Le Pen, the godfather of one of his children, who was incidentally baptised by a traditionalist French Catholic priest. A day of protest in 2014 called “Le jour de colère” (the Day of Anger) organised by extreme right-wing groups in which the cries “Jews out! Jews, France is not your home” were notoriously heard, also vociferously expressed its support for Dieudonne, not least by frequent use of the quenelle gesture.

I have been reflecting on what it is that brings together the right and the left in their hostility towards Jews and Judaism. I think it is the sense of “particularism” that is linked to Judaism, whether this is seen in racial or religious terms – indeed, I think that such overlapping between the religious and the racial identities may indeed provide part of the offence to some. Jewish “particularism” stands as an affront to the competing nationalist particularism of many right-wing groups; at the same time, it is unacceptable to the theoretical universalist and internationalist vision propagated by the left. The British Jewish leader Jonathan Sacks, while he was Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth, wrote *The Dignity of Difference*, in which he argued that the valuing of difference and particularity is a contribution that the Jewish religious tradition has and continues to offer to the wider world. Sacks is, I believe, right, broadly speaking, but it is precisely such values that seem to create hostility in parts of the political and intellectual world.

In some ways this is connected to what is one of my own particular dislikes, which is the desire by some Arab voices to refuse to allow the word and concept “anti-Semitic/antisemitic” simply to apply to Jews but to argue that it also applies to those who claim Arab identity.¹⁰ I have heard

¹⁰ See footnote 1 above.

on a number of occasions, and sadly not least by some participants in WCC meetings, the cry uttered, “Anti-Semitism applies to me: I am a Semite too”. Frankly, quite apart from being a misunderstanding of how the English language works, for English is not a language that is governed by the etymological origin of words, such an appropriation does seem to me to be a rather crude example of antisemitism itself.

I think that a sense of universal uncomfortableness with Jewish particularism goes at least some way to explain the apparent antagonism and controversy in the United Kingdom in recent years between some of the leadership of the Labour Party and the Jewish community. This was focused around the controversy over the definition of antisemitism issued in May 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). As this definition has become so central to the discussion, not simply in the United Kingdom, the whole of it is included within this article. The definitional statement commences with: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” It then goes on as follows:

To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations: Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective – such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e. g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e. g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e. g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

Personally, I find this definition – or at least how it has become seen – not to be problem free. As I understand it there is, or at least there ought to be, a qualitative difference between the comparatively short definition which was formally what was agreed at the meeting in 2016, and the quite extensive list of worked “contemporary examples”. An example, in my understanding, is not the same genre as a definition. Of course, particularly contentious are the examples that link in any way to “Israel”. In fact, after the publication of the definition an all-party group in the UK Parliament discussed the topic, and to take account of the concern that the definition and examples might prohibit legitimate criticism of Israel made the following comment:

We broadly accept the IHRA definition, but propose two additional clarifications to ensure that freedom of speech is maintained in the context of discourse about Israel and Palestine, without allowing antisemitism to permeate any debate. The definition should include the following statements:

- It is not antisemitic to criticise the Government of Israel, without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent.
- It is not antisemitic to hold the Israeli Government to the same standards as other liberal democracies, or to take a particular interest in the Israeli Government’s policies or actions, without additional evidence to suggest antisemitic intent.

It would be true to say that, in recent years, the various political parties have used the IHRA definition as a political football, to a considerable extent to play cross-party politics. Most publicity has been given to the Labour party’s discussion and views, which became more and more con-

tentious as the discussion progressed. It is intriguing that the issue of the Labour Party and antisemitism has gone on so long and got so complicated that the national UK broadcaster, the BBC, has set up a webpage entitled “A guide to Labour Party antisemitism claims” which seeks to present as succinctly as possible the whole story.¹¹ Initially there was the desire among Labour politicians to amend or leave out some of the examples in the IHRA list relating to Israel that were considered to frustrate legitimate criticism of Israel. In fact, what the Labour Party was proposing was not that different from what had been suggested by the all-party parliamentary group. However, I think that the reason – or at least a major reason – why the changes that were proposed by the Labour Party were not acceptable to the wider community is what I would call the “gut” issue. Let me explain what I mean by this.

Although I am personally and professionally interested in antisemitism as part of my work in Jewish-Christian relations, I had felt that the ongoing debate over the IHRA definition had become rather tedious and sterile. What changed my view was the publication in mid-August 2018 of a comment that Jeremy Corbyn had made five years earlier. He spoke about some Jewish individuals with whom he had got into an argument. I quote here from the report of Corbyn’s words in *The Guardian*:

[Corbyn] mentions an impassioned speech made at a meeting in parliament about the history of Palestine that was “dutifully recorded by the thankfully silent Zionists who were in the audience” (audience members he presumably knew nothing about). So far so bad. But it gets worse. He goes on to say that these unnamed Zionists in the audience “clearly have two problems. One is they don’t want to study history, and secondly, having lived in this country for a very long time, probably all their lives, they don’t understand English irony either ... So I think they needed two lessons, which we can perhaps help them with.”¹²

Indeed, the Zionists were Jews – and such deliberate coalescence of Judaism and Zionism does seem to be a part of left-wing antisemitism. To what extent left-wing antisemitism is linked to the migrant communities in Britain I am not quite sure. It is interesting, however, that it is a Labour politician of Pakistani origin, Naz Shah, who has made some of the most offensive remarks on the subject. But it is another Labour politician of Pakistani

¹¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45030552> (accessed 8.10.2019).

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/24/jeremy-corbyn-antisemitism-labour-zionists-2013-speech> (accessed 8.10.2019).

origin, Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, who went out of his way to reassure the Jewish communities in the city after the Pittsburgh massacre.

My own reaction to what Corbyn said was itself a “gut” one. Instinctively I felt it made it obvious that Corbyn really dislikes Jews at a fundamental and emotional level. The implication of his remarks was that Jews in the UK were somehow not “fully” English. It made me feel that underlying all the debates going on the Labour Party about the IHRA statement – and Corbyn was at the centre of these – there was a real visceral dislike of Jews and Judaism, perhaps evidenced also by an infamous mural which Corbyn had supported – and quite likely without even realising what it portrayed.¹³ The mural depicts a group of financiers, who were clearly intended to be “stereotypically” Jewish and who were shown as oppressing a group of workers who were bearing the heavy burden caused by their actions. Ironically, this picture was not particularly linked to what I have referred to as the “new antisemitism”: it rather spun an old antisemitic trope which dates back at least as far as Shakespeare’s Shylock.

So perhaps what I am trying to say here is that antisemitism and indeed anti-Zionism is not necessarily something to be measured primarily in intellectual terms. There are legitimate points of discussion and difference over a number of issues, particularly in relation to Israel. But one can “smell” antisemitism of the right or the left primarily at a heart rather than head level, linked in some way into how and whether Jews are fully perceived as people, as human beings, who are entitled to their own views and concerns that need to be seriously engaged with, whether we agree with them or not. The point was well-made in an article by the non-Jewish writer Gary Younge in the UK newspaper *The Guardian*. After observing that (partly due to the prevalence of antisemitism throughout most of the 20th century) the vast majority of the Jews in Britain would call themselves Zionist, Younge goes on to remark,

That doesn’t mean that gentiles have to support Zionism or Israel just because most Jews do. But it does mean that they cannot simply dismiss Zionism if they are at all interested in entering into any meaningful dialogue with the Jewish community. And it means that they have to be sensitive to why Jews support Israel in order to influence their views. To deny this is to maintain that

¹³ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/antisemitism-open-your-eyes-jeremy-corbyn-labour> (accessed 8.10.2019).

it is irrelevant what Jews think. It is to move to a political place where Jews do not matter – a direction which they will understandably not follow, because they were herded there before and almost extinguished as a people.¹⁴

One final point: I have focused in this paper on “traditional” antisemitism of the right, and the “new antisemitism” of the left. The intelligence report from Sweden that I mentioned above also refers to a third form of antisemitism – what it calls “Enlightenment antisemitism” or *Aufklärungsantisemitismus*.¹⁵ This is basically an Enlightenment-based critique of traditional Jewish practices such as male circumcision and ritual slaughter according to kosher practice. Although this may not be intended as antisemitism, this Enlightenment-inspired attitude, which is most pronounced and frequently expressed in the clearly more Protestant, modernised and secularised countries in Europe, can feel threatening to a group that increasingly feels themselves to be a minority of a minority. It was therefore an interesting issue to raise, however briefly, at a conference that explores the relation between religion and state.

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¹⁴ Gary Younge, ‘Terms of abuse’, *The Guardian*, 25 February 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/25/race.uk> (accessed 8.10.2019).

¹⁵ <http://www.kantorcenter.tau.ac.il/sites/default/files/PP%203%20Antisemitisms%20160608.pdf>, p.23 (accessed 8.10.2019).

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem politisch mehrheitlich linksorientierten, sogenannten «neuen Antisemitismus» auseinander, der sich gegen jüdische Personen richtet und den Staat Israel kritisiert. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Phänomen des «durch Israel inspirierten Antisemitismus» geschenkt, der sich in erster Linie gegen Mitglieder der jüdischen Diaspora richtet. Die Autorin untersucht antisemitische Bewegungen, wie sie insbesondere in Grossbritannien und Frankreich zu beobachten sind, und fragt, ob sich dieses Verhalten vor allem bei Migrantinnen und Migranten zeige. Ausserdem reflektiert sie darüber, was den «alten» und den «neuen» Antisemitismus verbindet. Für ein adäquates Verständnis der Thematik sollten sowohl Bauchgefühl-Reaktionen als auch intellektuelle Argumente einbezogen werden.

Keywords – Schlüsselwörter:

Antisemitism – United Kingdom – France – Israel – Jews